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The Florida Constitution1 confers a quasi-legislative role upon the
Supreme Court of Florida authorizing it to adopt uniform practice and
procedural rules applicable to the state’s courts.
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Introduction
The Florida Constitution1 confers a quasi-legislative role upon the
Supreme Court of Florida authorizing it to adopt uniform practice and
procedural rules applicable to the state's courts. Pursuant to this power
the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted in 1967 in order
"to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding.
They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness
in administration."'2 However, in some instances the rules have failed to
promote the requisite simplicity: Rule 3.390(a)3 is an example of a ju-
dicial rule which does not effectuate such simplicity. This tenet's appli-
cation, both in its original and amended version, has caused confusion
as is made apparent by judicial misinterpretations in the lower courts.
In essence, Rule 3.390(a) established the right of either party to
have the jury instructed on the maximum and minimum sentence
which could be imposed with an adjudication of guilt. Controversy
arose concerning the semantic interpretation given the language of the
rule. Was the requirement that the judge on request instruct the jury
directory or mandatory? Further, if instruction giving is mandatory,
does its omission constitute reversible or harmless error? This note ad-
dresses these questions. First the rule's history and purpose will be ex-
amined. Later, developing caselaw and legal analysis will be described
to illustrate its application in Florida's courts.
1. Article V, section 3 of the Florida Constitution was adopted November 6,
1956 in a general election. It states, "[t]he practice and procedure in all courts shall be
governed by rules adopted by the Supreme Court." Fla. Const. art. V, § 3.
2. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.020.
3. The original and amended versions will be given in their chronological devel-
opment later in the text.
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Historical Perspective
In order to fully comprehend both the scope and implications of
the minimum-maximum sentencing rule, a historical viewpoint illus-
trating the development of the rule is imperative. Prior to granting the
Florida Supreme Court authority to codify rules of procedure, the leg-
islature enacted statutes specifying such procedural guidelines. Many
of these statutes, including Rule 3.390(a) evolved into specific Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure.4 When the Florida State Legislature en-
acted The Criminal Procedure Act,5 in 1939, Statute 918.10 (entitled
"Charge to Jury") Section (1) provided, "[t]he presiding judge shall
charge the jury only upon the law of the case at the conclusion of the
argument of counsel."17 The statute was amended in 1945, adding, "and
must include in said charge the penalties fixed by law for the offenses
for which the accused is then on trial."8
The Supreme Court of Florida first interpreted the statute in Sim-
mons v. State.9 The basis for the appeal was the judge's failure to
charge the jury as required by Florida Statute 918.10. The court recog-
nized uncertainty in the statutory language: it was unclear whether the
charge was mandatory or directory. In deciding the issue, the court
relied strongly on the general premise that the jury's sole function is to
determine issues of fact and apply the appropriate law in rendering its
decision. Contrarily, the court's function is to instruct the jury on the
law pertinent to the factual situation. "[I]f the court is required to de-
part from this course and discuss matters having no bearing on the true
function of the jury, the trial necessarily is disconcerted and
impeded." 10
4. In fact, as Albert Datz noted in 1968, "most of the rules are patterned after
statutes which were in existence at the time the rules were adopted; and in many in-
stances the statutes were lifted verbatim and placed into rules." Datz, Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 42 FLA. B.J. 285 (1968).
5. The Criminal Procedure Act became effective October 19, 1939. The criminal
courts were then governed with a uniform procedural act until the adoption of the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
6. 1940 Fla. Laws 239 (1940).
7. Id.
8. 1945 Fla. Laws 239 as amended by FLA. STAT. § 918.10 (1969).
9. 160 Fla. 626, 36 So. 2d 207 (1948).
10. Id. at -, 36 So. 2d at 208.
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The supreme court also scrutinized the constitutionality of the
statute, focusing on the separation of powers doctrine. In the court's
view the enactment attempted to mandate a new procedural role for
the courts by altering their discretionary authority to instruct the jury.
The court conceded that while the legislature has the power to establish
guidelines in procedural areas, primary judicial power and discretion
cannot be hindered by legislative regulation.
The Simmons opinion seemed to suggest the rule was unconstitu-
tional, yet the court avoided direct pronouncement on this question.
Taking a different route, the court construed the rule in a light
designed to prevent constitutionally fatalambiguity and applied a sav-
ing judicial gloss:
It will be observed that statute 918.10, in directing the court to
charge upon the penalty, uses the word "must", rather than
"may". If the statute be interpreted as an unqualified mandate that
the court in every criminal case include in the charge the penalty
which might be imposed, rather than a mere grant of the privilege
to so charge, it becomes an unreasonable infringement of the inher-
ent power of the court to perform the judicial function because it
burdens the court with doing an empty and meaningless act."
The court reasoned that the legislature is presumed to intend con-
stitutional enactments. Thus the legislature must have intended the
trial judge to retain discretion in using the additional charge. To this
end, the court further concluded that "shall" in legislative enactments
usually connotes a "grant of authority" which is subject to limitations
of power. Through the interpretation of the words "must" and "shall' ' 12
11. Id.
12. The problem with defining 'shall' and 'must' is that the courts across the
nation have placed different interpretations on the meaning of the words depending
upon the context. Some courts interpret 'shall' to be mandatory. Swift v. Smith, 110
Colo. 126, 201 P.2d 609, 614 (1948); Brown v. Hecht Co., 137 F.2d 689, 692 (D.C.
Cir. 1943); State v. Bradley, 147 Ga. App. 569, 249 S.E.2d 365, 366 (1978). Others
agree with the Florida Supreme Court and assert that it depends on the construction of
the statute. Wirlis v. 'Seeley, 33 Ohio Op. 287, 68 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1946); Faunce v.
Carter, 26 Wash. 2d 219, 173 P.2d 526, 528 (1946); Barkely v. Pool, 102 Neb. 799,
169 N.W. 730, 732 (1918); In Re Dupont Borough Wards, 36 Pa. Commw. Ct. 504,
387 A.2d 1367, 1369 (1978).
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to mean "may," 13 the court determined that the statute should be ap-
plied in a discretionary, not mandatory, manner.
Adoption of the Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(a)
When the Supreme Court of Florida adopted the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure in 1967, Section 918.10(1)14 of the Florida Stat-
utes became Rule 3.390(a). 15 Since the wording of this statute did not
clearly indicate whether the rule was mandatory or directory the Sim-
mons rational appeared dispositive. Nevertheless, the point became
multilitigous.
In 1974, the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted the new rule in
Johnson v. State.,' The defendant had been convicted of second degree
murder. The defense counsel requested in writing that the judge in-
struct the jury on the maximum penalties, which the judge refused.
The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court denial by
relying upon the Simmons rationale that the rule was directory rather
than mandatory. The supreme court explained the distinction stating,
"[i]f the requirements of the rule are mandatory, it must be complied
with by the trial judge; if, however, such language is directory only, the
granting or denying of a request for such instruction would rest within
the sound discretion of the trial judge. ' ' 17 In its affirmance the court
relied primarily on the argument that because sentencing was not a
'Must' also has been construed as mandatory. State v. Reese, 365 Mo. 1221; 274
S.W.2d 304, 308 (1954). However, the majority of the courts have interpreted in con-
text. In Re Atkins Estate, 121 Cal. App. 251, 8 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1932); Robinson v.
City of Saginaw, 267 Mich. 557, 255 N.W. 296 (1934).
13. The court's interpretation of "shall" as "may" is a direct contradiction to the
1977 amendment interpretation. See note 27.
14. Section 918.10 had been slightly reworded to state that "[a]t the conclusion
of argument of counsel the court shall charge the jury. The charge shall be only on the
law of the case and must include the penalty for the offense for which the accused is
being charged." FLA. STAT. § 918.10(1) (1967). Interestingly, the legislature did not
repeal this statute when the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted.
15. FLA. R. CRIM. P. Jury Instructions 3.390(a) provides: "The presiding judge
shall charge the jury only upon the law of the case at the conclusion of argument of
counsel, and must include in said charge the penalty fixed by law for the offense for
which the accused is then on trial."
16. 308 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1974).
17. Id. at 39.
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jury function it was not the trial court's function to give instructions on
penalties to be imposed. Bolstering its rationale, the court pointed to
the consistency of their Simmons and Johnson decisions with Florida's
Standard Jury Instruction:
[T]he language of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases
2.14 (as validated by Rule 3.985 of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure) which instructs the jury that it is not to be concerned
with the imposition of any penalty if it reaches a verdict of guilty,
except as it may be connected with a recommendation of mercy.18
However, in using the Simmons decision as a precedent, the Johnson
court in essence contradicted itself. In Simmons, interpretation of the
statute was overshadowed by the possible violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. Avoiding the constitutional issue, that court inter-
preted the statute broadly in order to alleviate its potential interference
with judicial responsibilities. But in 1967, when the supreme court
adopted the the identical language of the statute into Rule 3.390(a), it
obviated any claim of legislative interference. Therefore, "the decision
amounted to a de facto amendment of the rule by substituting 'may'
for 'must'." 19 The courts continued to follow this interpretation until
the 1977 amendment.
1977 Amendment to Rule 3.390(a)
In 1977, Rule 3.390(a) was amended 20 as follows:
The presiding judge shall charge the jury only upon the law of the
case at the conclusion of argument of counsel and upon request of
either the State or the defendant the judge shall include in said
charge maximum and minimum sentences which may be imposed
(including probation) for the offense for which the accused is then
on trial.2 '
18. Id. at 40.
19. Yetter, The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure: 1977 Amendments, 5
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 243, 302 (1977).
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Due to the altered language of the 1977 amendment lower courts were
uncertain of its interpretation. Since the previous rule had not been
construed by its plain meaning it was unclear which direction the su-
preme court would pursue. In other words, what did "shall" 22 mean?
The district courts' interpretations of the new rule followed contra-
dictory patterns of logic as illustrated in two leading cases, Tascano v.
State23 and Murray v. State.24 The First District Court of Appeal, in
Tascano, stated "in light of the previous judicial decisions construing
the term 'must' as 'may', we are hesitant to conclude that the rule, by
use of the term 'shall', means what it says and is accordingly
mandatory. ' 25 The court then held that the rule was discretionary and
not mandatory even though "shall" is mandatory language. In 1980,
the Fifth District Court of Appeal decided Murray, which differed
from the semantic interpretation given "shall" in Tascano. The Mur-
ray court felt that a change in the language signalled that the interpre-
tation had been altered, and therefore concluded that "shall" was
meant to be mandatory, as indicated in Webster's New Collegiate Dic-
tionary.26 Although this interpretation was at variance with Tascano, it
did little to alter the outcome. The court invalidated the mandatory
language utilizing instead the Johnson rationale that the Florida Stan-
dard Jury Instruction 2.1527 required the jury to disregard penalty in
determining guilt or innocence. Thus, the court concluded, a judge's
22. "Shall" has been interpreted by Florida courts to have a mandatory meaning.
Holloway v. State, 342 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1977); Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529 (Fla.
1962); J.W.H. v. State, 345 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
23. 363 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
24. 378 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
25. Id. at 407.
26. Id. at 112.
27. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 210(a) provides:
(A) You are to disregard the consequences of your verdict. You are im-
paneled and sworn only to find a verdict based upon the law and the evi-
dence. You are to consider only the testimony which you have heard
(along with other evidence which has been received) and the law as given
to you by the court.
You are to lay aside any personal feeling you may have in favor of, or
against, the state and in favor of, or against, the defendant. It is only
human to have personal feeling or sympathy in matters of this kind, but
any such personal feeling or sympathy has no place in the consideration of
your verdict. When you have determined the guilt, or innocence, of the
6




failure to adhere to the literal language of Rule 3.390(a) cannot be
reversible error, for it is illogical to reverse a conviction "upon the basis
that the jury was not afforded information which it was then obligated
to disregard. '28 If courts were required to follow such contradictory
principles it would be "suggestive of a Lewis Carroll fantasy flight back
and forth through the legal looking glass."29 Therefore, even if the stat-
ute is mandatory, it loses much of its strength since failure to comply
does not warrant reversal.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed Tascano3
The court decided that if the amendment was to have the prior direc-
tory meaning, the 1977 alteration would have been "meaningless and
accomplished nothing.""1 Thus, the court concluded that it is
mandatory, upon the request of either counsel, to instruct on maximum
and minimum sentences which may be imposed. Justice Alderman, in
his dissent, agreed with the district court in Murray that Rule 3.390(a)
was inconsistent with the Florida Standard Jury Instructions. 32 Consis-
tent with the Murray rationale he sought to invoke the harmless error
doctrine because the instruction required the jury to disregard the
mandatory penalty instruction; failure to give this instruction would
have no bearing on the determination of guilt. Additionally, Justice Al-
derman noted that in amending this tenet, no commentary indicated an
intent to overrule the Johnson decision. The dissent's disdain for the
confusion created by the amendment is obvious:
If a majority of this court intends that, when requested, an instruc-
tion on penalties is mandatory, then the court should promulgate a
new rule that clearly and directly tells judges and lawyers of this
state that the rule is mandatory and not directory."
In deciding Tascano, the court declared the decision prospective,u
accused, you have completely fulfilled your solemn obligation under your
oath.
28. 378 So. 2d at 112.
29. Id.
30. 393 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1980).
31. Id. at 541.
32. Id. at 542.
33. Id.
34. The court could have made the decision retroactive but decided to make it
36 IError & Rule 3.390(a)
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and reversed for a new trial. The various state's attorneys disagreed
with the decision that the conviction was reversible. In future cases, it
was contended, failure to adhere to Rule 3.390(a) would be a harmless
error.35 The various district courts were confronted with the dilemma of
whether they should proceed upon the precedent established in Tas-
cano3 6 or follow the narrow, mandatory interpretation by relying on the
rationale in Murray.3 7 The supreme court ended the dilemma by re-
viewing the district court's decision in Murray. Recognizing the obvi-
ous conflict with Tascano, the court quashed the Murray decision to
facilitate consistency. The harmless error doctrine was found inapplica-
ble because, "this mandatory duty could be circumvented on the basis
of the harmless error rule, [and] the effects of the mandatory provision
in the rule would be negated."3 8 To be consistent the court reviewed
Knight v. State39 and Allen v. State,4" both of which relied on the ap-
pellate decision in Murray. The court clarified its position on pending
cases when it reaffirmed that "the defendant, as well as all others who
have preserved this point on appeal, received the benefit of this inter-
pretation of the rule."'"
As broad as the rule appears, it is narrowed by the fact that de-
fense counsel must make formal objection in order to preserve the point
for appeal.42 In Welty v. State43 the supreme court continued to con-
prospective and "applicable to all cases in which a jury trial is commenced on or after
the effective date of this opinion." Id. at 541.
35. FLA. STAT. § 59.041 (1979) states that:
No judgement shall be set aside or reversed, or new trial granted by any
court of the state in any cause, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirec-
tion of the jury or the improper admission or rejection of evidence or for
error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of
the court to which application is made, after an examination of the entire
case it shall appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscar-
riage of justice. This section shall be liberally construed.
36. See Moyers v. State, 400 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Wesley
v. State, 400 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
37. 378 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
38. 403 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1981).
39. 394 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1981).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. FLA. R. CRIM. P. Jury Instruction Rule 3.390(a) states:
No party may assign as error grounds of appeal the giving or the failure to
8
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strict the rule. The defendant argued for reversal since the judge failed
to adhere to Tascano. The district court refused to reverse:
On several occasions during the trial the jury was advised that the
maximum penalty for murder in the first degree was death and the
minimum penalty was life imprisonment. The trial court failure to
again advise the jury on what it had already been told was not a
reversible error.44
The Welty decision revealed the court's flexibility in applying Rule
3.390(a). Since the possible penalties were presented to the jury, al-
though not specifically in the instructions, the court refused to reverse a
conviction on a technical procedural error.
Perspective
The developing interpretation of Rule 3.390(a) illustrates the
court's authoritative power in its quasi-legislative role. Because the
court has rejected application of the harmless error doctrine when in-
struction has been incorrectly withheld, the state has been compelled to
retry a convicted defendant in an overworked criminal justice system.
Judges and district attorneys are frustrated. As Marc Gorden, an As-
sistant State Attorney, stated, "[t]here are at least 20 cases in all and
at least half a dozen major cases that we've had to rehandle because of
a technical error . . . .It's created a substantial problem for us."'45 He
also said that the cost to the criminal justice system is hard to deter-
mine. In Florida today, with the increasing crime rate, both the cost of
criminal justice and popular indignation over protecting a criminal with
procedural technicalities, is mounting.
When the court adopted the rule, no commentary rationalized the
give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to con-
sider the verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects, and the
grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection
out of the presence of the jury.
The court also held that this applies to the Tascano decision. Kelly v. State, 389 So. 2d
251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
43. 402 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 1981).
44. Id. at 1160.
45. Fort Lauderdale News, Dec. 27, 1981, § B, at 1, col. 2.
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stringent guidelines. This could be explained by the increasingly diffi-
cult task faced by jurors who weigh the factual evidence and apply the
complex laws given in jury instructions. Considering the degree of re-
sponsibility given jurors, is it not imperative that they understand the
gravity of their decision and know that the death sentence, life impris-
onment or probation is possible? The gravity of the situation should
inspire greater consciousness in jury deliberations.
Alderman, in his dissent in Tascano, recognized that the court
could have prevented confusion by clearly and explicitly stating the in-
tention of the amendment. He noted that the court failed to adhere to
precedent in its interpretation of "must" and "shall. ' 46 The court's in-
decision has resulted in a number of cases requiring reversal based on
the rule. Alderman's position is supported by the Conference of Circuit
Courts which asked the supreme court to reverse the decisions based on
the rule. Judge Futch, of Broward County, observing the contradiction
in the rule said, "[h]ow can a jury disregard the consequences of a
verdict when you tell them the penalties? It's asking too much of the
jury to disregard it. They're human too.' 7
Opposition has been unsuccessful in changing the supreme court's
costly interpretation of this rule. The tenet has been clearly defined as
its guidelines have been explicitly stated for the lower courts. With pre-
cedent established, the court in Welty indicated that less than strict
adherence would suffice. The court will not reverse a lower court's deci-
sion on a purely procedural mistake if the lower court complies with
the essence of the rule. The outer limits of the court's flexibility remain
untested; presently it is clear only that the jury must be fully aware of
the possible penalties or the decision will be reversed. It seems ironic
that judges, by failing to give requested, written instructions, will gen-
erate an otherwise avoidable source of judicial waste.
Roberta Stanley Kaib
46. 393 So. 2d at 541, 542.
47. Fort Lauderdale News, Dec. 27, 1981, § B, at 4, col. 2.
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